Current File : /home/vacivi36/vittasync.vacivitta.com.br/vittasync/node/deps/openssl/openssl/crypto/cmp/cmp_vfy.c
/*
* Copyright 2007-2023 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
* Copyright Nokia 2007-2020
* Copyright Siemens AG 2015-2020
*
* Licensed under the Apache License 2.0 (the "License"). You may not use
* this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy
* in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
* https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
*/
/* CMP functions for PKIMessage checking */
#include "cmp_local.h"
#include <openssl/cmp_util.h>
/* explicit #includes not strictly needed since implied by the above: */
#include <openssl/asn1t.h>
#include <openssl/cmp.h>
#include <openssl/crmf.h>
#include <openssl/err.h>
#include <openssl/x509.h>
/* Verify a message protected by signature according to RFC section 5.1.3.3 */
static int verify_signature(const OSSL_CMP_CTX *cmp_ctx,
const OSSL_CMP_MSG *msg, X509 *cert)
{
OSSL_CMP_PROTECTEDPART prot_part;
EVP_PKEY *pubkey = NULL;
BIO *bio;
int res = 0;
if (!ossl_assert(cmp_ctx != NULL && msg != NULL && cert != NULL))
return 0;
bio = BIO_new(BIO_s_mem()); /* may be NULL */
/* verify that keyUsage, if present, contains digitalSignature */
if (!cmp_ctx->ignore_keyusage
&& (X509_get_key_usage(cert) & X509v3_KU_DIGITAL_SIGNATURE) == 0) {
ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_CMP, CMP_R_MISSING_KEY_USAGE_DIGITALSIGNATURE);
goto sig_err;
}
pubkey = X509_get_pubkey(cert);
if (pubkey == NULL) {
ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_CMP, CMP_R_FAILED_EXTRACTING_PUBKEY);
goto sig_err;
}
prot_part.header = msg->header;
prot_part.body = msg->body;
if (ASN1_item_verify_ex(ASN1_ITEM_rptr(OSSL_CMP_PROTECTEDPART),
msg->header->protectionAlg, msg->protection,
&prot_part, NULL, pubkey, cmp_ctx->libctx,
cmp_ctx->propq) > 0) {
res = 1;
goto end;
}
sig_err:
res = ossl_x509_print_ex_brief(bio, cert, X509_FLAG_NO_EXTENSIONS);
ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_CMP, CMP_R_ERROR_VALIDATING_SIGNATURE);
if (res)
ERR_add_error_mem_bio("\n", bio);
res = 0;
end:
EVP_PKEY_free(pubkey);
BIO_free(bio);
return res;
}
/* Verify a message protected with PBMAC */
static int verify_PBMAC(OSSL_CMP_CTX *ctx, const OSSL_CMP_MSG *msg)
{
ASN1_BIT_STRING *protection = NULL;
int valid = 0;
/* generate expected protection for the message */
if ((protection = ossl_cmp_calc_protection(ctx, msg)) == NULL)
return 0; /* failed to generate protection string! */
valid = msg->protection != NULL && msg->protection->length >= 0
&& msg->protection->type == protection->type
&& msg->protection->length == protection->length
&& CRYPTO_memcmp(msg->protection->data, protection->data,
protection->length) == 0;
ASN1_BIT_STRING_free(protection);
if (!valid)
ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_CMP, CMP_R_WRONG_PBM_VALUE);
return valid;
}
/*-
* Attempt to validate certificate and path using any given store with trusted
* certs (possibly including CRLs and a cert verification callback function)
* and non-trusted intermediate certs from the given ctx.
*
* Returns 1 on successful validation and 0 otherwise.
*/
int OSSL_CMP_validate_cert_path(const OSSL_CMP_CTX *ctx,
X509_STORE *trusted_store, X509 *cert)
{
int valid = 0;
X509_STORE_CTX *csc = NULL;
int err;
if (ctx == NULL || cert == NULL) {
ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_CMP, CMP_R_NULL_ARGUMENT);
return 0;
}
if (trusted_store == NULL) {
ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_CMP, CMP_R_MISSING_TRUST_STORE);
return 0;
}
if ((csc = X509_STORE_CTX_new_ex(ctx->libctx, ctx->propq)) == NULL
|| !X509_STORE_CTX_init(csc, trusted_store,
cert, ctx->untrusted))
goto err;
valid = X509_verify_cert(csc) > 0;
/* make sure suitable error is queued even if callback did not do */
err = ERR_peek_last_error();
if (!valid && ERR_GET_REASON(err) != CMP_R_POTENTIALLY_INVALID_CERTIFICATE)
ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_CMP, CMP_R_POTENTIALLY_INVALID_CERTIFICATE);
err:
/* directly output any fresh errors, needed for check_msg_find_cert() */
OSSL_CMP_CTX_print_errors(ctx);
X509_STORE_CTX_free(csc);
return valid;
}
/* Return 0 if expect_name != NULL and there is no matching actual_name */
static int check_name(const OSSL_CMP_CTX *ctx, int log_success,
const char *actual_desc, const X509_NAME *actual_name,
const char *expect_desc, const X509_NAME *expect_name)
{
char *str;
if (expect_name == NULL)
return 1; /* no expectation, thus trivially fulfilled */
/* make sure that a matching name is there */
if (actual_name == NULL) {
ossl_cmp_log1(WARN, ctx, "missing %s", actual_desc);
return 0;
}
str = X509_NAME_oneline(actual_name, NULL, 0);
if (X509_NAME_cmp(actual_name, expect_name) == 0) {
if (log_success && str != NULL)
ossl_cmp_log2(INFO, ctx, " subject matches %s: %s", expect_desc,
str);
OPENSSL_free(str);
return 1;
}
if (str != NULL)
ossl_cmp_log2(INFO, ctx, " actual name in %s = %s", actual_desc, str);
OPENSSL_free(str);
if ((str = X509_NAME_oneline(expect_name, NULL, 0)) != NULL)
ossl_cmp_log2(INFO, ctx, " does not match %s = %s", expect_desc, str);
OPENSSL_free(str);
return 0;
}
/* Return 0 if skid != NULL and there is no matching subject key ID in cert */
static int check_kid(const OSSL_CMP_CTX *ctx,
const ASN1_OCTET_STRING *ckid,
const ASN1_OCTET_STRING *skid)
{
char *str;
if (skid == NULL)
return 1; /* no expectation, thus trivially fulfilled */
/* make sure that the expected subject key identifier is there */
if (ckid == NULL) {
ossl_cmp_warn(ctx, "missing Subject Key Identifier in certificate");
return 0;
}
str = OPENSSL_buf2hexstr(ckid->data, ckid->length);
if (ASN1_OCTET_STRING_cmp(ckid, skid) == 0) {
if (str != NULL)
ossl_cmp_log1(INFO, ctx, " subjectKID matches senderKID: %s", str);
OPENSSL_free(str);
return 1;
}
if (str != NULL)
ossl_cmp_log1(INFO, ctx, " cert Subject Key Identifier = %s", str);
OPENSSL_free(str);
if ((str = OPENSSL_buf2hexstr(skid->data, skid->length)) != NULL)
ossl_cmp_log1(INFO, ctx, " does not match senderKID = %s", str);
OPENSSL_free(str);
return 0;
}
static int already_checked(const X509 *cert,
const STACK_OF(X509) *already_checked)
{
int i;
for (i = sk_X509_num(already_checked /* may be NULL */); i > 0; i--)
if (X509_cmp(sk_X509_value(already_checked, i - 1), cert) == 0)
return 1;
return 0;
}
/*-
* Check if the given cert is acceptable as sender cert of the given message.
* The subject DN must match, the subject key ID as well if present in the msg,
* and the cert must be current (checked if ctx->trusted is not NULL).
* Note that cert revocation etc. is checked by OSSL_CMP_validate_cert_path().
*
* Returns 0 on error or not acceptable, else 1.
*/
static int cert_acceptable(const OSSL_CMP_CTX *ctx,
const char *desc1, const char *desc2, X509 *cert,
const STACK_OF(X509) *already_checked1,
const STACK_OF(X509) *already_checked2,
const OSSL_CMP_MSG *msg)
{
X509_STORE *ts = ctx->trusted;
int self_issued = X509_check_issued(cert, cert) == X509_V_OK;
char *str;
X509_VERIFY_PARAM *vpm = ts != NULL ? X509_STORE_get0_param(ts) : NULL;
int time_cmp;
ossl_cmp_log3(INFO, ctx, " considering %s%s %s with..",
self_issued ? "self-issued ": "", desc1, desc2);
if ((str = X509_NAME_oneline(X509_get_subject_name(cert), NULL, 0)) != NULL)
ossl_cmp_log1(INFO, ctx, " subject = %s", str);
OPENSSL_free(str);
if (!self_issued) {
str = X509_NAME_oneline(X509_get_issuer_name(cert), NULL, 0);
if (str != NULL)
ossl_cmp_log1(INFO, ctx, " issuer = %s", str);
OPENSSL_free(str);
}
if (already_checked(cert, already_checked1)
|| already_checked(cert, already_checked2)) {
ossl_cmp_info(ctx, " cert has already been checked");
return 0;
}
time_cmp = X509_cmp_timeframe(vpm, X509_get0_notBefore(cert),
X509_get0_notAfter(cert));
if (time_cmp != 0) {
ossl_cmp_warn(ctx, time_cmp > 0 ? "cert has expired"
: "cert is not yet valid");
return 0;
}
if (!check_name(ctx, 1,
"cert subject", X509_get_subject_name(cert),
"sender field", msg->header->sender->d.directoryName))
return 0;
if (!check_kid(ctx, X509_get0_subject_key_id(cert), msg->header->senderKID))
return 0;
/* prevent misleading error later in case x509v3_cache_extensions() fails */
if (!ossl_x509v3_cache_extensions(cert)) {
ossl_cmp_warn(ctx, "cert appears to be invalid");
return 0;
}
if (!verify_signature(ctx, msg, cert)) {
ossl_cmp_warn(ctx, "msg signature verification failed");
return 0;
}
/* acceptable also if there is no senderKID in msg header */
ossl_cmp_info(ctx, " cert seems acceptable");
return 1;
}
static int check_cert_path(const OSSL_CMP_CTX *ctx, X509_STORE *store,
X509 *scrt)
{
if (OSSL_CMP_validate_cert_path(ctx, store, scrt))
return 1;
ossl_cmp_warn(ctx,
"msg signature validates but cert path validation failed");
return 0;
}
/*
* Exceptional handling for 3GPP TS 33.310 [3G/LTE Network Domain Security
* (NDS); Authentication Framework (AF)], only to use for IP messages
* and if the ctx option is explicitly set: use self-issued certificates
* from extraCerts as trust anchor to validate sender cert -
* provided it also can validate the newly enrolled certificate
*/
static int check_cert_path_3gpp(const OSSL_CMP_CTX *ctx,
const OSSL_CMP_MSG *msg, X509 *scrt)
{
int valid = 0;
X509_STORE *store;
if (!ctx->permitTAInExtraCertsForIR)
return 0;
if ((store = X509_STORE_new()) == NULL
|| !ossl_cmp_X509_STORE_add1_certs(store, msg->extraCerts,
1 /* self-issued only */))
goto err;
/* store does not include CRLs */
valid = OSSL_CMP_validate_cert_path(ctx, store, scrt);
if (!valid) {
ossl_cmp_warn(ctx,
"also exceptional 3GPP mode cert path validation failed");
} else {
/*
* verify that the newly enrolled certificate (which assumed rid ==
* OSSL_CMP_CERTREQID) can also be validated with the same trusted store
*/
OSSL_CMP_CERTRESPONSE *crep =
ossl_cmp_certrepmessage_get0_certresponse(msg->body->value.ip,
OSSL_CMP_CERTREQID);
X509 *newcrt = ossl_cmp_certresponse_get1_cert(ctx, crep);
/*
* maybe better use get_cert_status() from cmp_client.c, which catches
* errors
*/
valid = OSSL_CMP_validate_cert_path(ctx, store, newcrt);
X509_free(newcrt);
}
err:
X509_STORE_free(store);
return valid;
}
static int check_msg_given_cert(const OSSL_CMP_CTX *ctx, X509 *cert,
const OSSL_CMP_MSG *msg)
{
return cert_acceptable(ctx, "previously validated", "sender cert",
cert, NULL, NULL, msg)
&& (check_cert_path(ctx, ctx->trusted, cert)
|| check_cert_path_3gpp(ctx, msg, cert));
}
/*-
* Try all certs in given list for verifying msg, normally or in 3GPP mode.
* If already_checked1 == NULL then certs are assumed to be the msg->extraCerts.
* On success cache the found cert using ossl_cmp_ctx_set0_validatedSrvCert().
*/
static int check_msg_with_certs(OSSL_CMP_CTX *ctx, const STACK_OF(X509) *certs,
const char *desc,
const STACK_OF(X509) *already_checked1,
const STACK_OF(X509) *already_checked2,
const OSSL_CMP_MSG *msg, int mode_3gpp)
{
int in_extraCerts = already_checked1 == NULL;
int n_acceptable_certs = 0;
int i;
if (sk_X509_num(certs) <= 0) {
ossl_cmp_log1(WARN, ctx, "no %s", desc);
return 0;
}
for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(certs); i++) { /* certs may be NULL */
X509 *cert = sk_X509_value(certs, i);
if (!ossl_assert(cert != NULL))
return 0;
if (!cert_acceptable(ctx, "cert from", desc, cert,
already_checked1, already_checked2, msg))
continue;
n_acceptable_certs++;
if (mode_3gpp ? check_cert_path_3gpp(ctx, msg, cert)
: check_cert_path(ctx, ctx->trusted, cert)) {
/* store successful sender cert for further msgs in transaction */
if (!X509_up_ref(cert))
return 0;
if (!ossl_cmp_ctx_set0_validatedSrvCert(ctx, cert)) {
X509_free(cert);
return 0;
}
return 1;
}
}
if (in_extraCerts && n_acceptable_certs == 0)
ossl_cmp_warn(ctx, "no acceptable cert in extraCerts");
return 0;
}
/*-
* Verify msg trying first ctx->untrusted, which should include extraCerts
* at its front, then trying the trusted certs in truststore (if any) of ctx.
* On success cache the found cert using ossl_cmp_ctx_set0_validatedSrvCert().
*/
static int check_msg_all_certs(OSSL_CMP_CTX *ctx, const OSSL_CMP_MSG *msg,
int mode_3gpp)
{
int ret = 0;
if (mode_3gpp
&& ((!ctx->permitTAInExtraCertsForIR
|| OSSL_CMP_MSG_get_bodytype(msg) != OSSL_CMP_PKIBODY_IP)))
return 0;
ossl_cmp_info(ctx,
mode_3gpp ? "normal mode failed; trying now 3GPP mode trusting extraCerts"
: "trying first normal mode using trust store");
if (check_msg_with_certs(ctx, msg->extraCerts, "extraCerts",
NULL, NULL, msg, mode_3gpp))
return 1;
if (check_msg_with_certs(ctx, ctx->untrusted, "untrusted certs",
msg->extraCerts, NULL, msg, mode_3gpp))
return 1;
if (ctx->trusted == NULL) {
ossl_cmp_warn(ctx, mode_3gpp ? "no self-issued extraCerts"
: "no trusted store");
} else {
STACK_OF(X509) *trusted = X509_STORE_get1_all_certs(ctx->trusted);
ret = check_msg_with_certs(ctx, trusted,
mode_3gpp ? "self-issued extraCerts"
: "certs in trusted store",
msg->extraCerts, ctx->untrusted,
msg, mode_3gpp);
sk_X509_pop_free(trusted, X509_free);
}
return ret;
}
static int no_log_cb(const char *func, const char *file, int line,
OSSL_CMP_severity level, const char *msg)
{
return 1;
}
/*-
* Verify message signature with any acceptable and valid candidate cert.
* On success cache the found cert using ossl_cmp_ctx_set0_validatedSrvCert().
*/
static int check_msg_find_cert(OSSL_CMP_CTX *ctx, const OSSL_CMP_MSG *msg)
{
X509 *scrt = ctx->validatedSrvCert; /* previous successful sender cert */
GENERAL_NAME *sender = msg->header->sender;
char *sname = NULL;
char *skid_str = NULL;
const ASN1_OCTET_STRING *skid = msg->header->senderKID;
OSSL_CMP_log_cb_t backup_log_cb = ctx->log_cb;
int res = 0;
if (sender == NULL || msg->body == NULL)
return 0; /* other NULL cases already have been checked */
if (sender->type != GEN_DIRNAME) {
ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_CMP, CMP_R_SENDER_GENERALNAME_TYPE_NOT_SUPPORTED);
return 0;
}
/* dump any hitherto errors to avoid confusion when printing further ones */
OSSL_CMP_CTX_print_errors(ctx);
/* enable clearing irrelevant errors in attempts to validate sender certs */
(void)ERR_set_mark();
ctx->log_cb = no_log_cb; /* temporarily disable logging */
/*
* try first cached scrt, used successfully earlier in same transaction,
* for validating this and any further msgs where extraCerts may be left out
*/
if (scrt != NULL) {
if (check_msg_given_cert(ctx, scrt, msg)) {
ctx->log_cb = backup_log_cb;
(void)ERR_pop_to_mark();
return 1;
}
/* cached sender cert has shown to be no more successfully usable */
(void)ossl_cmp_ctx_set0_validatedSrvCert(ctx, NULL);
/* re-do the above check (just) for adding diagnostic information */
ossl_cmp_info(ctx,
"trying to verify msg signature with previously validated cert");
(void)check_msg_given_cert(ctx, scrt, msg);
}
res = check_msg_all_certs(ctx, msg, 0 /* using ctx->trusted */)
|| check_msg_all_certs(ctx, msg, 1 /* 3gpp */);
ctx->log_cb = backup_log_cb;
if (res) {
/* discard any diagnostic information on trying to use certs */
(void)ERR_pop_to_mark();
goto end;
}
/* failed finding a sender cert that verifies the message signature */
(void)ERR_clear_last_mark();
sname = X509_NAME_oneline(sender->d.directoryName, NULL, 0);
skid_str = skid == NULL ? NULL
: OPENSSL_buf2hexstr(skid->data, skid->length);
if (ctx->log_cb != NULL) {
ossl_cmp_info(ctx, "trying to verify msg signature with a valid cert that..");
if (sname != NULL)
ossl_cmp_log1(INFO, ctx, "matches msg sender = %s", sname);
if (skid_str != NULL)
ossl_cmp_log1(INFO, ctx, "matches msg senderKID = %s", skid_str);
else
ossl_cmp_info(ctx, "while msg header does not contain senderKID");
/* re-do the above checks (just) for adding diagnostic information */
(void)check_msg_all_certs(ctx, msg, 0 /* using ctx->trusted */);
(void)check_msg_all_certs(ctx, msg, 1 /* 3gpp */);
}
ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_CMP, CMP_R_NO_SUITABLE_SENDER_CERT);
if (sname != NULL) {
ERR_add_error_txt(NULL, "for msg sender name = ");
ERR_add_error_txt(NULL, sname);
}
if (skid_str != NULL) {
ERR_add_error_txt(" and ", "for msg senderKID = ");
ERR_add_error_txt(NULL, skid_str);
}
end:
OPENSSL_free(sname);
OPENSSL_free(skid_str);
return res;
}
/*-
* Validate the protection of the given PKIMessage using either password-
* based mac (PBM) or a signature algorithm. In the case of signature algorithm,
* the sender certificate can have been pinned by providing it in ctx->srvCert,
* else it is searched in msg->extraCerts, ctx->untrusted, in ctx->trusted
* (in this order) and is path is validated against ctx->trusted.
* On success cache the found cert using ossl_cmp_ctx_set0_validatedSrvCert().
*
* If ctx->permitTAInExtraCertsForIR is true and when validating a CMP IP msg,
* the trust anchor for validating the IP msg may be taken from msg->extraCerts
* if a self-issued certificate is found there that can be used to
* validate the enrolled certificate returned in the IP.
* This is according to the need given in 3GPP TS 33.310.
*
* Returns 1 on success, 0 on error or validation failed.
*/
int OSSL_CMP_validate_msg(OSSL_CMP_CTX *ctx, const OSSL_CMP_MSG *msg)
{
X509 *scrt;
ossl_cmp_debug(ctx, "validating CMP message");
if (ctx == NULL || msg == NULL
|| msg->header == NULL || msg->body == NULL) {
ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_CMP, CMP_R_NULL_ARGUMENT);
return 0;
}
if (msg->header->protectionAlg == NULL /* unprotected message */
|| msg->protection == NULL || msg->protection->data == NULL) {
ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_CMP, CMP_R_MISSING_PROTECTION);
return 0;
}
switch (ossl_cmp_hdr_get_protection_nid(msg->header)) {
/* 5.1.3.1. Shared Secret Information */
case NID_id_PasswordBasedMAC:
if (ctx->secretValue == NULL) {
ossl_cmp_info(ctx, "no secret available for verifying PBM-based CMP message protection");
ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_CMP, CMP_R_MISSING_SECRET);
return 0;
}
if (verify_PBMAC(ctx, msg)) {
/*
* RFC 4210, 5.3.2: 'Note that if the PKI Message Protection is
* "shared secret information", then any certificate transported in
* the caPubs field may be directly trusted as a root CA
* certificate by the initiator.'
*/
switch (OSSL_CMP_MSG_get_bodytype(msg)) {
case -1:
return 0;
case OSSL_CMP_PKIBODY_IP:
case OSSL_CMP_PKIBODY_CP:
case OSSL_CMP_PKIBODY_KUP:
case OSSL_CMP_PKIBODY_CCP:
if (ctx->trusted != NULL) {
STACK_OF(X509) *certs = msg->body->value.ip->caPubs;
/* value.ip is same for cp, kup, and ccp */
if (!ossl_cmp_X509_STORE_add1_certs(ctx->trusted, certs, 0))
/* adds both self-issued and not self-issued certs */
return 0;
}
break;
default:
break;
}
ossl_cmp_debug(ctx,
"sucessfully validated PBM-based CMP message protection");
return 1;
}
ossl_cmp_warn(ctx, "verifying PBM-based CMP message protection failed");
break;
/*
* 5.1.3.2 DH Key Pairs
* Not yet supported
*/
case NID_id_DHBasedMac:
ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_CMP, CMP_R_UNSUPPORTED_PROTECTION_ALG_DHBASEDMAC);
break;
/*
* 5.1.3.3. Signature
*/
default:
scrt = ctx->srvCert;
if (scrt == NULL) {
if (ctx->trusted == NULL) {
ossl_cmp_info(ctx, "no trust store nor pinned server cert available for verifying signature-based CMP message protection");
ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_CMP, CMP_R_MISSING_TRUST_ANCHOR);
return 0;
}
if (check_msg_find_cert(ctx, msg))
return 1;
} else { /* use pinned sender cert */
/* use ctx->srvCert for signature check even if not acceptable */
if (verify_signature(ctx, msg, scrt)) {
ossl_cmp_debug(ctx,
"sucessfully validated signature-based CMP message protection");
return 1;
}
ossl_cmp_warn(ctx, "CMP message signature verification failed");
ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_CMP, CMP_R_SRVCERT_DOES_NOT_VALIDATE_MSG);
}
break;
}
return 0;
}
/*-
* Check received message (i.e., response by server or request from client)
* Any msg->extraCerts are prepended to ctx->untrusted.
*
* Ensures that:
* its sender is of appropriate type (curently only X509_NAME) and
* matches any expected sender or srvCert subject given in the ctx
* it has a valid body type
* its protection is valid (or invalid/absent, but only if a callback function
* is present and yields a positive result using also the supplied argument)
* its transaction ID matches the previous transaction ID stored in ctx (if any)
* its recipNonce matches the previous senderNonce stored in the ctx (if any)
*
* If everything is fine:
* learns the senderNonce from the received message,
* learns the transaction ID if it is not yet in ctx,
* and makes any certs in caPubs directly trusted.
*
* Returns 1 on success, 0 on error.
*/
int ossl_cmp_msg_check_update(OSSL_CMP_CTX *ctx, const OSSL_CMP_MSG *msg,
ossl_cmp_allow_unprotected_cb_t cb, int cb_arg)
{
OSSL_CMP_PKIHEADER *hdr;
const X509_NAME *expected_sender;
if (!ossl_assert(ctx != NULL && msg != NULL && msg->header != NULL))
return 0;
hdr = OSSL_CMP_MSG_get0_header(msg);
/* validate sender name of received msg */
if (hdr->sender->type != GEN_DIRNAME) {
ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_CMP, CMP_R_SENDER_GENERALNAME_TYPE_NOT_SUPPORTED);
return 0;
}
/*
* Compare actual sender name of response with expected sender name.
* Mitigates risk to accept misused PBM secret
* or misused certificate of an unauthorized entity of a trusted hierarchy.
*/
expected_sender = ctx->expected_sender;
if (expected_sender == NULL && ctx->srvCert != NULL)
expected_sender = X509_get_subject_name(ctx->srvCert);
if (!check_name(ctx, 0, "sender DN field", hdr->sender->d.directoryName,
"expected sender", expected_sender))
return 0;
/* Note: if recipient was NULL-DN it could be learned here if needed */
if (sk_X509_num(msg->extraCerts) > 10)
ossl_cmp_warn(ctx,
"received CMP message contains more than 10 extraCerts");
/*
* Store any provided extraCerts in ctx for use in OSSL_CMP_validate_msg()
* and for future use, such that they are available to ctx->certConf_cb and
* the peer does not need to send them again in the same transaction.
* Note that it does not help validating the message before storing the
* extraCerts because they do not belong to the protected msg part anyway.
* For efficiency, the extraCerts are prepended so they get used first.
*/
if (!X509_add_certs(ctx->untrusted, msg->extraCerts,
/* this allows self-signed certs */
X509_ADD_FLAG_UP_REF | X509_ADD_FLAG_NO_DUP
| X509_ADD_FLAG_PREPEND))
return 0;
/* validate message protection */
if (hdr->protectionAlg != NULL) {
/* detect explicitly permitted exceptions for invalid protection */
if (!OSSL_CMP_validate_msg(ctx, msg)
&& (cb == NULL || (*cb)(ctx, msg, 1, cb_arg) <= 0)) {
#ifndef FUZZING_BUILD_MODE_UNSAFE_FOR_PRODUCTION
ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_CMP, CMP_R_ERROR_VALIDATING_PROTECTION);
return 0;
#endif
}
} else {
/* detect explicitly permitted exceptions for missing protection */
if (cb == NULL || (*cb)(ctx, msg, 0, cb_arg) <= 0) {
#ifndef FUZZING_BUILD_MODE_UNSAFE_FOR_PRODUCTION
ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_CMP, CMP_R_MISSING_PROTECTION);
return 0;
#endif
}
}
/* check CMP version number in header */
if (ossl_cmp_hdr_get_pvno(hdr) != OSSL_CMP_PVNO) {
#ifndef FUZZING_BUILD_MODE_UNSAFE_FOR_PRODUCTION
ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_CMP, CMP_R_UNEXPECTED_PVNO);
return 0;
#endif
}
if (OSSL_CMP_MSG_get_bodytype(msg) < 0) {
#ifndef FUZZING_BUILD_MODE_UNSAFE_FOR_PRODUCTION
ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_CMP, CMP_R_PKIBODY_ERROR);
return 0;
#endif
}
/* compare received transactionID with the expected one in previous msg */
if (ctx->transactionID != NULL
&& (hdr->transactionID == NULL
|| ASN1_OCTET_STRING_cmp(ctx->transactionID,
hdr->transactionID) != 0)) {
#ifndef FUZZING_BUILD_MODE_UNSAFE_FOR_PRODUCTION
ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_CMP, CMP_R_TRANSACTIONID_UNMATCHED);
return 0;
#endif
}
/* compare received nonce with the one we sent */
if (ctx->senderNonce != NULL
&& (msg->header->recipNonce == NULL
|| ASN1_OCTET_STRING_cmp(ctx->senderNonce,
hdr->recipNonce) != 0)) {
#ifndef FUZZING_BUILD_MODE_UNSAFE_FOR_PRODUCTION
ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_CMP, CMP_R_RECIPNONCE_UNMATCHED);
return 0;
#endif
}
/* if not yet present, learn transactionID */
if (ctx->transactionID == NULL
&& !OSSL_CMP_CTX_set1_transactionID(ctx, hdr->transactionID))
return 0;
/*
* RFC 4210 section 5.1.1 states: the recipNonce is copied from
* the senderNonce of the previous message in the transaction.
* --> Store for setting in next message
*/
if (!ossl_cmp_ctx_set1_recipNonce(ctx, hdr->senderNonce))
return 0;
/*
* Store any provided extraCerts in ctx for future use,
* such that they are available to ctx->certConf_cb and
* the peer does not need to send them again in the same transaction.
* For efficiency, the extraCerts are prepended so they get used first.
*/
if (!X509_add_certs(ctx->untrusted, msg->extraCerts,
/* this allows self-signed certs */
X509_ADD_FLAG_UP_REF | X509_ADD_FLAG_NO_DUP
| X509_ADD_FLAG_PREPEND))
return 0;
if (ossl_cmp_hdr_get_protection_nid(hdr) == NID_id_PasswordBasedMAC) {
/*
* RFC 4210, 5.3.2: 'Note that if the PKI Message Protection is
* "shared secret information", then any certificate transported in
* the caPubs field may be directly trusted as a root CA
* certificate by the initiator.'
*/
switch (OSSL_CMP_MSG_get_bodytype(msg)) {
case OSSL_CMP_PKIBODY_IP:
case OSSL_CMP_PKIBODY_CP:
case OSSL_CMP_PKIBODY_KUP:
case OSSL_CMP_PKIBODY_CCP:
if (ctx->trusted != NULL) {
STACK_OF(X509) *certs = msg->body->value.ip->caPubs;
/* value.ip is same for cp, kup, and ccp */
if (!ossl_cmp_X509_STORE_add1_certs(ctx->trusted, certs, 0))
/* adds both self-issued and not self-issued certs */
return 0;
}
break;
default:
break;
}
}
return 1;
}
int ossl_cmp_verify_popo(const OSSL_CMP_CTX *ctx,
const OSSL_CMP_MSG *msg, int acceptRAVerified)
{
if (!ossl_assert(msg != NULL && msg->body != NULL))
return 0;
switch (msg->body->type) {
case OSSL_CMP_PKIBODY_P10CR:
{
X509_REQ *req = msg->body->value.p10cr;
if (X509_REQ_verify_ex(req, X509_REQ_get0_pubkey(req), ctx->libctx,
ctx->propq) <= 0) {
#ifndef FUZZING_BUILD_MODE_UNSAFE_FOR_PRODUCTION
ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_CMP, CMP_R_REQUEST_NOT_ACCEPTED);
return 0;
#endif
}
}
break;
case OSSL_CMP_PKIBODY_IR:
case OSSL_CMP_PKIBODY_CR:
case OSSL_CMP_PKIBODY_KUR:
if (!OSSL_CRMF_MSGS_verify_popo(msg->body->value.ir, OSSL_CMP_CERTREQID,
acceptRAVerified,
ctx->libctx, ctx->propq)) {
#ifndef FUZZING_BUILD_MODE_UNSAFE_FOR_PRODUCTION
return 0;
#endif
}
break;
default:
ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_CMP, CMP_R_PKIBODY_ERROR);
return 0;
}
return 1;
}
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